



Monetary integration vs. real disintegration

Single currency and productivity divergence in the euro area

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Content


- Two tales of monetary integration: Pangloss vs. Murphy
- Some stylized facts
- Many explanations that do not fit the data
- Three recent strands of literature
- Some empirical estimates
- Policy conclusions



Tales of monetary integration /1
Pangloss reloaded: all will be for the best...

- Short-term (manageable) threats:
 - idiosyncratic shocks and one-size-fits-all monetary policy: Eichengreen-Krugman vs. Frankel-Rose;
 - deflationary bias: Dornbusch vs. Modigliani.
- Long-run (invaluables) opportunities:
 - no balance-of-payment constraint anymore;
 - national investment «will not be constrained by national saving» and market allocative mechanism will finance only viable borrowers (Emerson et al. 1991);
 - capital will go where it is needed;
 - nominal convergence will be an opportunity for weaker countries, fostering their real convergence.

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Tales of monetary integration /2
A politically constrained research agenda


- A lot of research on idiosyncratic shocks.
- Because the **long-run was not an issue**.
- Because they could be studied using **fashionable VAR models** in the Blanchard-Quah tradition.
- Because of their **political meaning**. If random shocks were the only issue:
 - a federal model could be **politically viable** (it works like an insurance, with transfers randomly going both ways);
 - unifying monetary policy before achieving political integration could have been sensible, insofar as it would **cause business cycle synchronization**.


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Ud'A Tales of monetary integration /3
 University degli Studi "G. d'Annunzio"
 Murphy's law...

- **Anything that can go wrong will go wrong.**
- **Trade promotion:**
 - Glick, R., & Rose, A. K. (2015). Currency unions and trade: A post-EMU mea culpa (No. w21535). NBER.
- **Business cycle synchronization:**
 - Granville, B., & Hussain, S. (2017). Eurozone cycles: an analysis of phase synchronization. *Int.Jof Fin.Ec.*, 22(2), 83-114.
- **Removal of the external constraint:**
 - Pisani-Ferry, J. (2013). The known unknowns and unknown unknowns of EMU. *J.Int.Mon.Fin.*, 34, 6-14.
- **Catch-up:**
 - Gopinath, G., et al. (2017). Capital allocation and productivity in South Europe. *QJE*, 132(4), 1915-1967.
- **Benefits of labour market reforms:**
 - Gordon, R.J., Dew-Becker, I. 2008. "The Role of Labor Market Changes in the Slowdown of European Productivity Growth", NBER WP 13840.

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Stylized facts /2

Short- vs. long-run

- A reversal of perspective: asymmetries in behaviours/structures rather than shocks:
 - Boltho A., and Carlin, W. 2013. “EMU’s Problems: Asymmetric Shocks or Asymmetric Behavior?” CES, 55(3), 387-403.
- Evidence: the Eurozone crisis starts with a massive «symmetric» shock (the global financial crisis).
- Implications:
 - for politics: a federal model could not be viable (different structures imply persistent one-way transfers);
 - for economics: does monetary union harmonize structure/trends?

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Three strands of literature /1

Inadequate explanations

- **Firms’ size**
 - Navaretti, G. B. et al. (2010). The global operations of European firms. Second EFIGE Policy Report.
 - **refuted by:** Calligaris, S. et al. (2016). Italy’s productivity conundrum. a study on resource misallocation in Italy (No. 030). DG ECFIN, EC.
- **Institutional quality/Lack of structural reforms**
 - Calligaris, S. et al. (2016). Italy’s productivity conundrum. a study on resource misallocation in Italy (No. 030). DG ECFIN, EC.
 - **refuted by:** Pellegrino, B., & Zingales, L. (2017). Diagnosing the Italian disease (No. w23964). NBER.
- **Wrong specialization**
 - Faini, R., & Sapir, A. (2005). An obsolete model? Growth and specialization in the Italian economy. in *Beyond decline*, Bologna: il Mulino, 19-77.
 - **refuted by:** Calligaris, S. et al. (2016). Italy’s productivity conundrum. a study on resource misallocation in Italy (No. 030). DG ECFIN, EC.

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Three strands of literature /2

Recent explanations

- **Capital misallocation**
 - Gopinath et al. 2015. “Capital Allocation and Productivity in South Europe”, NBER Working Paper No. 21453.
 - Cette et al. 2016. “The pre-Great Recession slowdown in productivity”. *European Economic Review*, 88, 3-20.
- **Exchange rate**
 - Marconi et al. 2016. “Manufacturing and economic development: The actuality of Kaldor’s first and second laws”, *SCED*, 37: 75-89.
 - Tomlin, B., Fung, L., 2010. “The effect of real exchange rate movements on heterogeneous plants: a quantile regression analysis”, *BoC WP2010-25*.
- **Labour market reforms**
 - Tridico, P. 2015. “From economic decline to the current crisis in Italy”, *International Review of Applied Economics*, 29(2): 164-193.
 - Addressi, W. 2014. The productivity effect of permanent and temporary labor contracts in the Italian manufacturing sector. *Economic Modelling*, 36, 666-672.

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Three strands of literature /3

Previous research

- Bagnai, A. 2016. Italy’s decline and the Balance-of-Payments constraint: a multicountry analysis. *IRAE* 30: 1-26.
 - Kaldor-Dixon-Thirlwall growth model
 - Cointegration estimates of the structural breaks in the BoP-constraint
- Cette et al. 2016 “The pre-Great Recession slowdown in productivity”. *EER*, 88, 3-20.
 - Gopinath et al. misallocation analysis
 - Dynamic panel evidence on misallocation

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Three strands of literature /4

Poor quality of neoclassical studies

- Cette et al. 2016 present several shortcomings:
 - assume homogeneity between core and periphery (Gopinath et al. stress the asymmetry)
 - use an incorrect estimator (subject to Nickell bias)
 - adopt a completely ad hoc dynamics specification
 - provide wrong estimates of the long-run effect
 - consider a very short sample (starting in 1995)
- As a consequence, the misallocation evidence is extremely fragile:
 - it disappears once you drop Italy from the panel
 - it disappears once you add the real exchange rate to the equation
 - Bagnai, A., Mongeau Ospina, C.A. «Neoclassical vs. Kaldorian explanations of Southern Europe's productivity slowdown», Acta Economica, 67(s1), <https://doi.org/10.1556/032.2017.67.S.9>

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Three strands of literature /5

Motivation of the study

- Study the long-run impact on productivity of:
 - the real interest rate (as Cette et al., 2016)
 - the real exchange rate (as Bagnai, 2016)
 - the employment protection index, taken as a proxy of labour market reforms (as Tridico, 2015)
- Verify the robustness of this relation by controlling for other variables used in the productivity literature
 - governance indicators: regulatory quality, corruption (Rodrik, 2008)
 - innovation

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Empirical results/1

Data and methodology

- EU KLEMS data on 26 ISIC sectors on the four largest Eurozone countries from 1986 to 2007 (the pre-crisis period)
- Two core and two peripheral countries
- Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) panel estimation (Pesaran et al., 1999)
 - deals with different orders of integration
 - provides estimates of both the short- and long-run parameters at once

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Empirical results/2

Definitions

- real interest rate
 - composite cost of borrowing for nonfinancial corporations (ECB) deflated by sectoral value added deflators (KLEMS)
- REER
 - CPI based REER (BIS)
 - ULC based REER (IMF)
- EPL
 - strictness of employment protection indicator (OECD)
- ICT
 - share of computing equipment, communication equipment and software over gross fixed capital formation (KLEMS)


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 **Empirical results/3**
Total Factor Productivity

dependent variable: TFP

	all sectors	manufacturing	services
real interest rate	1.26 (11.43)	1.91 (11.31)	1.65 (7.27)
REER	-0.53 (-11.34)	-0.63 (-9.42)	-0.71 (-7.78)
EPL	0.28 (4.48)	0.19 (2.41)	1.01 (6.30)
ICT	0.07 (4.34)	0.14 (5.22)	-0.05 (-1.41)


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 **Empirical results/4**
Average Labour Productivity

dependent variable: value added per hour worked

	all sectors	manufacturing	services
real interest rate	1.52 (12.09)	1.38 (8.23)	0.46 (3.34)
REER	-0.59 (-11.62)	-0.55 (-8.95)	-0.93 (-12.28)
EPL	0.50 (7.19)	0.56 (6.17)	0.42 (4.62)
ICT	0.11 (6.57)	0.09 (3.40)	0.07 (5.31)


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Empirical results/5
Discussion

- Two major causes of asymmetries:
 - interest rate (the fall in Southern countries was larger; Lane, 2005)
 - exchange rate (depreciation in the core and appreciation in the periphery)
- Once the «scale effect» is taken into account, through REER, evidence on the misallocation effect becomes more robust


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Conclusions/1
A radical change of policy is needed...

- By fostering productivity divergence, monetary union, rather than endogenously optimal, could become endogenously unsustainable.
- Over time, benefits from low interest rate for public finance are offset by the consequences of subdued growth on the banking system.
- Low interest rates:
 - foster political credit cycles
 - bring about capital misallocation (among countries and sectors)

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 **Conclusions/2**
...but extremely unlikely to happen



Nicholas Kaldor
(1971)

It is a dangerous error to believe that monetary and economic union can precede a political union. For if the creation of a monetary union and Community control over national budgets generates pressures which lead to a breakdown of the whole system it will prevent the development of a political union, not promote it.

«The dynamic effects of the common market»,
The New Statesman

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